The Center for Foreign Interference Research (CFIR) is a non-profit, non-government, non-partisan research organization dedicated to tracking, analyzing, and raising awareness of foreign interference activities targeting democracies around the world.
Founded in 2021 and based in Washington, D.C., CFIR monitors foreign interference globally. We recognize that interference is not exclusive to any single bloc of nations — all states can be both sources and targets. Our goal is to document these activities wherever they occur, regardless of who is responsible.
Foreign interference undermines democratic institutions, erodes public trust, and threatens national sovereignty. Yet much of this activity goes unreported, under-analyzed, or buried across fragmented news sources. CFIR exists to change that.
We aggregate, classify, and publish research on foreign interference events so that journalists, policymakers, academics, and the public can understand the scale, methods, and actors involved. Our goal is to make this information accessible, searchable, and useful — regardless of which country is the source or the target.
We publish original research reports on foreign interference events, drawing on open-source intelligence, government reports, court filings, academic papers, and investigative journalism. Each report is classified by source country, target country, and method of interference to enable pattern analysis across our database.
CFIR maintains a structured database of foreign interference incidents. Every entry is tagged with metadata including the actor (source country), the target, the methods used, and the date of the event. This allows researchers to query interference patterns by country, method, or time period.
Our Trends dashboard provides interactive visualizations of interference patterns over time, including which methods are most prevalent, which countries are most active as sources, and which nations are most frequently targeted.
Foreign interference takes many forms. CFIR classifies incidents using the following taxonomy of methods:
Covert or overt attempts to influence electoral processes, voter behavior, or election infrastructure in foreign countries.
Coordinated spreading of false or misleading information through media, social platforms, or fabricated outlets to shape public opinion.
State-sponsored hacking, data theft, or surveillance targeting government, military, or private sector systems.
Actions by a foreign state to intimidate, surveil, harass, or silence diaspora communities and dissidents abroad.
Use of trade restrictions, sanctions threats, investment leverage, or debt diplomacy to coerce policy changes in target nations.
Infiltration of universities and research institutions to steal intellectual property or influence research agendas.
Cultivation of political elites, lobbyists, or media figures to advance a foreign state’s agenda covertly.
Use of military posturing, incursions, or proxy forces to pressure or destabilize target nations.
Cyber or physical attacks targeting critical infrastructure such as power grids, communications, or transport systems.
Theft or coerced transfer of sensitive technologies, trade secrets, or dual-use research through espionage or front companies.
Strategic use of information and communication channels to undermine adversaries, including propaganda, censorship, and narrative manipulation.
Exploitation of cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities to manipulate decision-making at individual and societal levels.
Placement of covert agents or recruitment of insiders within government agencies, corporations, or civil society organizations.
Clandestine activities by foreign intelligence services including human intelligence gathering, asset recruitment, and covert action programs.
Systematic circumvention of international sanctions through shell companies, illicit financial networks, or third-party intermediaries.
Offensive cyber operations directed by or on behalf of a state, including ransomware, supply chain compromises, and destructive malware.
Covert efforts to undermine, manipulate, or co-opt political parties, movements, or governance structures in target countries.
State-backed efforts to control or distort media narratives through co-opted journalists, fake news outlets, or coordinated amplification campaigns.
Use of non-state armed groups, militias, or mercenary forces to advance a state’s strategic objectives while maintaining deniability.
Deliberate use of bribery, illicit financing, or corrupt patronage networks to gain political influence or undermine governance in target states.
Foreign interference is not a one-directional phenomenon. Many countries are simultaneously sources and targets of interference activities. CFIR tracks these dynamics across regions, documenting interference regardless of which state is responsible.
Canada, Cuba, Mexico, United States
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom
Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, North Korea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
India, Iran
Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Countries frequently appear in our database as both source and target. For example, the United States is one of the most frequently targeted nations but also conducts well-documented interference activities abroad. The same is true of Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and others. Our database reflects this reality without editorial bias toward any particular bloc or alliance.
CFIR is entirely volunteer-run. Our team includes researchers, analysts, and technologists who contribute their time and expertise because they believe that documenting foreign interference is essential to protecting democratic institutions.
Administrative costs are funded by donations from our volunteers. We accept no funding from governments, political parties, or organizations that could compromise our independence or impartiality.
There are several ways you can support our work:
For press inquiries, research collaboration, or general questions, reach out to us via LinkedIn or X.
© 2021–2026 Center for Foreign Interference Research (CFIR). All rights reserved.